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CHAPTER 14 
Evidence 
JAMES B. KRASNOO* AND JOHN C. OTTENBERG** 
§14.1. Introduction. The major development in the law of evi-
dence during the Survey year was the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. A study of those rules is beyond the scope of this Chapter 
and is better left to another forum. 1 Although the adoption of those 
rules necessarily dwarfs all other changes in the law of evidence over 
the last year, the courts of this Commonwealth have not been idle. 
This Chapter attempts to highlight those cases that either significantly 
change a rule of evidence, or analyze an existing rule in a new or 
unique manner. 
§ 14.2. Relevancy: Evidence of Post-Sale, Pre-Accident Improve-
ments. The novel question of the admissibility of evidence 
of improvements in a machine's safety mechanism, developed after 
sale of the machine but prior to the time of accident, was one of the 
issues presented by the case of do Canto v. Ametek, Inc. 1 The Supreme 
Judicial Court affirmed the ruling of the trial judge, who admitted 
such evidence for the limited purposes of (1) demonstrating the feasi-
bility of redesign of the machine's safety features, (2) showing the 
defendant's knowledge, if any, of inadequacies in the machine's exist-
ing safety features, and (3) establishing the defendant's duty, if any, to 
warn past purchasers of any deficiency in the safety features. 2 
The plaintiff was injured in a commercial laundry while working on 
a flatwork ironer manufactured by the defendant. While feeding 
sheets into the ironer, her hand was caught in a sheet and pulled into 
the ironer, causing serious injuries. 3 A safety bar, located at some dis-
tance from the rollers in the ironer, was activated when the 
plaintiffs hand passed beneath it, cutting off electrical power to the 
*JAMES B. KRASNOO is a partner in the law firm of Norris, Kozodoy & Krasnoo, Bos-
ton. 
**JoHN C. 0TTENBERG is an associate in the law firm of Barron & Stadfeld, Boston. 
§14.1. 1 See generally WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE (1975). 
§14.2. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1591, 328 N.E.2d 873. 
2 !d. at 1594, 328 N.E.2d at 875-76. 
3 !d. at 1592, 328 N.E.2d at 875. 
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machinery.4 Although the power was cut off, the momentum of the 
rollers (overtravel) continued to pull the sheet toward the ironer. 
When the machine was working at maximum speed, the distance of 
the overtravel was greater than the distance between the safety bar 
and the danger point on the roller, thereby bringing the plaintifrs 
hand under the heat and pressure of the ironer.5 After the sale of the 
particular ironer on which the plaintiff was injured, but before the 
date of the injury, the defendant manufacturer redesigned the 
machine by adding a mechanism that reduced the amount of over-
travel and by relocating the safety bar.8 
The admissibility of evidence of remedial measures taken subsequent 
to an accident has received a good deal of attention. The rule that 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures may not be used as an ad-
mission of fault is well established; 7 the traditional rationale, based on 
considerations of relevancy and public policy, is twofold. The first 
rationale is that such evidence is not necessarily probative on the ques-
tion of negligence. As Wigmore has observed: 
to improve the condition of the injury-causing object is therefore 
to indicate a belief merely that it has been capable of causing such 
an injury, but indicates nothing more and is equally consistent 
with a belief in injury by mere accident, or by contributory neg-
ligence, as well as by the owner's negligence. 8 
The same thought was more artistically stated by Baron Bramwell 
when he wrote that to take such evidence as evidence of negligence 
"would be ... to hold that, because the world gets wiser as it gets 
older, therefore it was foolish before."9 
Although evidence of subsequent remedial measures does not of it-
self prove negligence, there cari be little doubt that under a normal 
standard of relevancy it would be admissible. Wigmore has noted that 
if the test for the admissibility of subsequent repairs were merely that 
of relevance, a rebuttable inference of defendant's negligence could 
arise. 10 Yet, even assuming that a rule such as Wigmore's has merit in 
terms of relevancy, another consideration tends to create an obstacle 
to admissibility: the likelihood that evidence of subsequent repairs will 
4Jd. 
IJd. 
8 /d, at 1593-94, 328 N.E.2d at 875. 
7 Ladd v. New York, New Haven Be H.R.R., 335 Mass. 117, 138 N.E.2d 346 (1956); 
Manchester v. City' of Attleboro, 288 Mass. 492, 193 N.E. 4 (1934); Shinners v. Pro-
prietors of Locks 8c Canals, 154 Mass. 168, 28 N.E. 10 (1891); K. HUGHES, EVIDENCE, 19 
MASS. PRAC. § 533, at 755 (1961) [hereinafter cited as HUGHES]; W. LEACH & P. LIACOS, 
HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 201 (4th ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as LEACH 
&LIACOS]. 
8 j. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 283, at 151 (3d ed. 1940) (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]. 
8 Hart v. Lancashire BeY. Ry., 21 L.T.R. (n.s.) 261, 263 (1869). 
10 WIGMORE, supra note 8, § 283, at 151. 
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have an inordinate impact upon a jury. As Hughes has suggested, de-
spite its relevance, the prejudicial dangers of evidence of subsequent 
safety measures may outweigh the probative value of such measures. 11 
The trial judge in do Canto had instructed the jury that evidence of 
the post-sale safety improvements "is not in and of itself any evidence 
of negligence."12 Because the issue before the Court on appeal was 
whether the evidence had been properly admitted for the three pur-
poses specified, the Court never expressly confirmed this ruling of the 
trial judge. It appears that some of the same considerations noted in 
the discussion of post-accident improvements apply to the question of 
admission of evidence of pre-accident modifications. That machines 
designed after the injury-causing one have been improved does not 
necessarily show that the original machine was negligently designed. 
Presumably, a machine properly designed at the time of manufacture 
can subsequently be improved. 
Notwithstanding the validity of admitting evidence of post-accident 
measures for such limited purposes, it is clear that evidence of pre-
accident remedial measures may have more probative value, simply 
because the defendant has acted earlier-i.e., he has reduced a risk 
prior to the occurrence of the injury. The countervailing considera-
tion is that the potential for undue prejudice will be greater in the 
pre-accident situation because the changes have already been made at 
the time of injury. Unfortunately, the Court did not embark upon 
such an analysis or comider the effect of such an analysis upon the 
general question of admissibility of pre-accident remedial measures. 
The second rationale for excluding evidence of post-accident re-
pairs and improvements is one of policy: a defendant would be inhib-
ited from immediately removing an existing danger if post-accident 
remedial measures could be introduced as an admission of negligence 
on his part. 13 This rationale has received severe criticism as of late. 
Weinstein has attacked it on three grounds, arguing that the lack of 
such a rule would not discourage remedial measures in most 
situations. 14 Some defendants will not even be aware of the implica-
tions of taking subsequent remedial measures. Others may be aware 
of the many exceptions under which such evidence may be admitted. 
Additionally, most defendants, especially responsibly insured ones, 
are likely to prevent the recurrence of a similar injury, especially in-
asmuch as evidence of the earlier accident would be admissible on the 
question of defendant's knowledge in a subsequent case. 15 
11 HUGHES. supra note 7, § 533, at 755. 
12 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1594, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
13 C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,§ 275, at 666 (2d ed. 1972) 
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK]; HUGHES, supra note 7, § 294, at 351; WIGMORE, supra 
note 8, § 283, at 151. 
14 WEINSTEIN, 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 407-9-10 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN]. 
15 /d. 
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There are also strong arguments for not applying the traditional 
policy rationale in the post-sale, pre-accident situation. The Court in 
do Canto observed that there is no vested tort claim when improve-
ments are contemplated in the pre-accident situation. 16 To counteract 
any fear of potential suit that could discourage the making of im-
provements are the stronger economic motivations of reducing future 
tort liability and of catering to customer demand for greater safety 
features. 17 
In do Canto, the defendant's argument for exclusion was based on 
the premise that pre- and post-accident improvements should receive 
similar treatment. 18 The Court, without elaboration, expressly refused 
to accept this contention as the rule in every situation.19 Nonetheless, 
for purposes of the issue before it, the Court reasoned that if the 
modifications had occurred after the accident, the trial judge would 
have been within his discretion to admit the evidence for certain lim-
ited purposes. 20 Evidence of remedial measures undertaken subse-
quent to an accident is admissible for a number of purposes, e.g., to 
show a defendant's control over the injury-producing premises. 21 Two 
of the three grounds upon which the evidence of the post-sale, pre-
accident improvements was admitted-feasibility of making the safety 
improvements and knowledge of the danger at the time of the 
injury-are recognized bases upon which a judge in his discretion 
may admit evidence of post-accident remedial measures. 22 The Court 
stated: "We see no reason why evidence of pre-accident remedial 
measures should be any less admissible for the same purposes."23 The 
third ground upon which the evidence was admitted, the defendant's 
duty to warn of any deficiency in the ironer's safety, was also upheld 
by the Court. 24 
In view of the Court's recognition of these three broadly based 
purposes for which evidence of modification in product design subse-
quent to sale is admissible, two problems come to the fore. First, it 
appears that such evidence will be admissible on one of these or other 
recognized grounds in almost every situation.25 In this sense, the ex-
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1596 n.3, 328 N.E.2d at 876 n.3. 
17 !d. 
18 /d. at 1594, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. at 1595, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
21 Finn v. Peters, 340 Mass. 622, 165 N.E.2d 896 (1960); Readman v. Conway, 126 
Mass. 374 (1879); LEACH & LIACOS,supra note 7, at 201. 
22 1975 Mass. Adv .. Sh. at 1595, 328 N.E.2d at 876, citing Beverly v. Boston Elevated 
Ry., 194 Mass. 450, 80 N.E. 507 (1907). See Reardon v. Country Club at Coonamessett, 
Inc., 353 Mass. 702, 234 N.E.2d 881 (1968); Coy v. Boston Elevated Ry., 212 Mass. 307, 
98 N.E. 1041 (1912) (feasibility). 
23 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1595-96, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
24 /d. at 1597, 328 N.E.2d at 877. But see id. at 1596 n.4, 328 N.E.2d at 876-77 n.4. 
2" See WEINSTEIN. supra note 14, at 407-10, and sources cited therein. 
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ception may swallow up the rule. Of course, to the extent that a jury 
can limit the application of such evidence to the purpose for which it 
has been admitted, the evidence is still not evidence of negligence it-
self. 
Introduction of evidence of remedial measures to prove some point 
other than negligence should only be allowed when that point is actu-
ally controverted in the lawsuit.26 Apparently, defendant Ametek had 
conceded in a general way that the design modifications were feasible. 
Nevertheless, the Court held that the evidence was not inadmissible 
simply because of the general concession.27 The precise nature of the 
concession made by the defendant is not reported by the Court. The 
Court relied on the case of Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown 28 in which the 
defendant manufacturer was willing to stipulate only that changes 
were feasible and had been made subsequent to the accident, but 
would not stipulate as to the specific changes actually made. 29 The 
proferred stipulation was held not sufficient to render inadmissible 
evidence of those remedial measures actually taken.30 The Boeing case, 
however, was not tried before a jury,31 and there is considerable doubt 
whether its principles are applicable to do Canto, where the risk of un-
duly prejud1cing the jury must be considered.32 It is suggested that 
the rule that such evidence is admissible only upon an issue actually 
controverted should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the evidence will 
certainly be admissible on almost every occasion. 33 
The second problem with the rule as presently applied is that the 
distinction between the use of such evidence to show negligence itself, 
and simply to show some other limited point, may be illusory. For ex-
ample, as Weinstein has pointed out in regard to the federal rule: 
"While Rule 407 permits such evidence to be used to show feasibility 
of further improvements, the reasonableness of the condition at the 
time of the accident may turn in part on the feasibility of remedial 
measures .... Any decision that evidence is being used to show 'feasi-
bility of precautionary measures' rather than negligence is to a con-
siderable extent arbitrary."34 
When such evidence is admitted for several, albeit "limited" pur-
16 See HUGHES, supra note 7, § 294, at 351-52, § 533, at 756; McCORMICK, supra note 
13, § 275, at 668. See also FED. R. Evm. 407. 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1596, 328 N.E.2d at 876. 
18 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961), cited in 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1596, 328 N.E.2d at 
876. 
19 ld. at 315. 
80 I d. 
81 ld. at 312. 
81 See id. at 315 n.3. See also WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 407-15-16. 
88 See HuGHEs, supra note 7, § 294 at 351-52; § 533 at 756; McCoRMICK, supra note 
13, § 275, at 668. 
84 WEINSTEIN, supra note 14, at 407-11, 407-14, 
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poses, the distinction becomes, if possible, even more tenuous. In a 
case such as do Canto, where the evidence is employed to show knowl-
edge of a risk, the feasibility of taking precautions against that risk, 
and the duty to warn of the risk, it is doubtful that the concept that 
the evidence is not proof of negligence will have any practical effect 
upon the jury or judge. 
Unfortunately, the Court in do Canto, although faced with an in-
teresting issue, dispensed with it with a minimum of analysis. The 
Court not only failed to confront the need for a fresh consideration 
of the efficacy of the present rule regarding remedial measures taken 
subsequent to injury, but also passed up an opportunity to set out the 
circumstances under which evidence of modifications in product de-
sign prior to injury will be admissible. Do Canto may be read to hint 
that the two situations will be treated alike. The Court, however, 
never holds any more than that evidence of pre-accident measures 
may be admitted in the trial judge's discretion for certain specified 
purposes, on the same terms upon which evidence of post-accident 
measures would be admissible. 
§14.3. Impeachment: Records of juvenile Offenses. Ordinarily, 
records of juvenile offenses will not be made available to, and cannot 
be used by, a party seeking to cross-examine a juvenile witness. 1 In 
Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 2 however, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that in certain circumstances the confidentiality afforded juvenile rec-
ords must give way to a defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
front the witnesses against him. 3 
In Ferrara, the defendants appealed from the trial judge's denial of 
a motion for the production of the juvenile records of a fourteen-
year-old boy who testified for the prosecution.4 The juvenile was the 
only witness who claimed to have seen the murder for which defen-
dants were tried. 5 The evidence indicated that shortly after the murder 
the juvenile fled the scene of the crime and hid from the police. 
Three days later, he was taken into custody, and he remained in cus-
tody at the time of trial. 6 
The witness' juvenile record included numerous charges, none of 
which, however, were for violent offenses. The record included an ad-
§14.3. 1 SeeG.L.c.119,§60. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2064, 330 N.E.2d 837. 
3 /d. at 2074, 330 N.E.2d at 842. 
4 Id. at 2065, 330 N.E.2d at 839. The Court rejected a construction of G.L. c. 119, 
§ 60, that would limit its application to juveniles who are parties in an action. Rather, it 
held that the section protects the juvenile whether his status is that of party or witness. 
!d. at 2067, 330 N.E.2d at 840. 
5 Id. at 2065, 330 N.E.2d at 839. 
6 /d. at 2067, 330 N.E.2d at 840. By the time of trial, the custody had become protec-
tive custody. /d. 
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judication of delinquency for breaking and entering, 7 and a resulting 
order for confinement to the Youth Service Board, which was in sus-
pended status at the time of the murder. 8 
The Supreme Judicial Court, relying on the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Davis v. Alaska, 9 noted that the proper test of ad-
missibility was whether the 'juvenile records of the witness had a ra-
tional tendency ... to show bias of the witness."10 In concluding that 
the record in the instant case tended to show bias and thus that the 
records were admissible, the Court stated that the juvenile, who pos-
sessed a record of relatively serious delinquencies, may have been 
motivated by a desire to please the authorities, and to direct their in-
vestigation away from himself. 11 
In so holding, the Court rejected the prosecution's effort to distin-
guish Davis, on the ground, inter alia, that the juvenile records in that 
case were far more probative on the issue of bias than were the rec-
ords in Ferrara. In Davis, there was a similarity between the offenses 
in the juvenile record and the one for which the defendant was being 
tried. 12 The prosecution in Ferrara contended that a juvenile with 
such a record would consider himself under investigation for the 
crime itself. 13 That possibility would not exist in the instant case, it 
was argued, where no connection existed between the nature of the 
charges on the juvenile record and the crime at issue. The prosecu-
tion attributed special significance to. the absence of indications of vio-
lence in the juvenile record. Nevertheless, the difference in the nature 
of the offenses did not dissuade the Court from assuming that the 
juvenile might nevertheless possess and maintain a self-interest in de-
flecting suspicion from himself. 14 
The presence of three other factors was sufficient to support an 
inference that the juvenile witness may have been biased. First, he was 
present at the commission of the crime,· and his flight from the mur-
der scene may have revealed that he thought himself a likely suspect. 
Second, the Court also recognized that, as in Davis, the juvenile had 
an interest in pleasing the authorities, spawned doubtlessly by being in 
custody at the time of trial. Third, the Court found that the juvenile's 
7 !d. 
8 /d. 
9 415 u.s. 307 (1974). 
10 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2070, 330 N.E.2d at 841. 
11 /d. at 2073, 330 N.E.2d at 842. 
12 Id. at 2071, 330 N.E.2d at 841. In Davis, the crimes charged were burglary and 
grand larceny. The juvenile witness had been adjudicated a delinquent for burglary and 
was on probation for that offense. !d. 
13 /d. In Davis, an additional consideration was that the metal safe, which the defen-
dant Davis was accused of having stolen and broken into, was found abandoned near 
the juvenile witness' home. !d. 
14 /d. at 2073, 330 N.E.2d at 842. 
7
Kransnoo and Ottenberg: Chapter 14: Evidence
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1975
§14.4 EVIDENCE 367 
testimony, as actually presented at the trial, indicated a concern by the 
witness with his own self-interest. 15 
The. result reached in Ferrara is correct: on the facts, the defendant's 
constitutional right to cross-examine the witness was clearly a more 
vital concern than the Gommonwealth's interest in protecting a 
juvenile. The juvenile was a crucial witness, and his conduct through-
out the case was reasonably susceptible of the inference that he was 
motivated by a desire to ingratiate himself with the authorities. 
§14.4. Impeachment: Civil Cases: Records of Prior Con-
victions. Section 21 . of chapter 233 of the General Laws provides 
that-except in certain limited circumstances-the conviction of a 
witness for a crime may be shown to affect his credibility. Recently, in 
the 1974 decision of Commonwealth v. DiMarzo,! Justice Hennessey 
criticized the lack of discretion that this rule currently provides the 
trial judge.2 He commented that prior convictions "even as applied 
only to the credibility issue, have little or no probative value in most 
instances."3 Furthermore, he doubted whether limiting instructions to 
the jury would avoid prejudicing a criminal defendant's case.4 
In two cases decided during the Survey year, Walter v. Bonito5 and 
Carey v. Zayre of Beverly, Inc., 6 the Court again expressed its displea-
sure with the current statutory rule. Both decisions involved issues 
raised by the admission of prior convictions for impeachment pur-
ui I d. The Court thought that at least one of the juvenile witness' answers at trial was 
particularly ripe for cross-examination. When asked why he ran away, the witness re-
plied: " 'I don't recall because I was worried about other things, bigger things than this 
litde ... [trouble].'" Id. Compare the United States Supreme Court's reaction in Davis 
v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), to the juvenile witness' denial that he had ever been in-
terrogated by police. Id. at 314. The Court doubted whether the juvenile would have 
denied any such contact with the police had he been under the belief that his testimony 
would be subject to cross-examination.· The Court went on to state that "(i]t would be 
difficult to conceive of a situation more clearly illustrating the need for cross-
examination.'' Id. 
§14.4. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 215, 308 N.E.2d 538. 
1 Id. at 224-29, 308 N.E.2d at 544-47 (concurring opinion). See generally Common-
wealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245, 258 N.E.2d 22 (1970); McLaughlin & Leonard, 
Evidence, 1970 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAw§ 27.2, at 679-81. 
3 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 228, 308 N.E.2d at 546. The federal and Massachusetts rules 
differ substantially. The federal rule provides for impeachment by evidence of prior 
convictions only when the convictions were for crimes that (I) involve dishonesty or 
false statement; or (2) are punishable by death or imprisonment for more than a year 
and, in the discretion of the court, their probative value exceeds their prejudicial effect. 
FED. R. Evm. 609(a). 
Rule 21 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence limits impeachment by prior convictions to 
crimes involving dishonesty or false statements. See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 617 n.2, 324 
N.E.2d at 628 n.2. 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 228, 308 N.E.2d at 546. 
• 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 609, 324 N.E.2d 624. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 619, 324 N.E.2d 619. 
8
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 18
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/18
368 1975 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.4 
poses, and underline some of the problems with the statutory rule. Al-
though Walter provides a guideline for determining reversible error 
when records of prior convictions are erroneously introduced, 7 when 
read together, the two cases do not appear to make a notable advance 
toward alleviating the inequities caused by the present rule. 
In WtJlter, plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for injuries sus-
tained as a result of defendant's allegedly negligent driving. 8 A major 
portion of the evidence consisted of the two drivers' conflicting 
accounts of the collision. As part of his affirmative case, the plaintiff 
called the defendant driver as his witness and proceeded to intro~uce 
into evidence records of that defendant's five prior convictions for 
motor vehicle violations.9 The trial judge admitted most of the rec-
ords, but limited their application to the impeachment of defendant's 
credibility .1 0 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the records were 
improperly admitted. 11 The Court found that the trial judge's ruling 
violated section 23 of chapter 233 of the General Laws, which pro-
vides that "[t]he party who produces a witness shall not impeach his 
credit by evidence of bad character .... "This result was mandated by 
the Court's past decisions, which (1) hold that prior criminal convic-
tions serve the purpose of proving bad character, 12 and (2) apply sec-
tion 23 to a party who calls his opponent as a witness. 13 Although it is 
not surprising that the Court did not break with precedent in light of 
the recent adoption of Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b), 
which forbids such impeachment of a party when called as a witness 
by the adverse party, 14 the Court did admit that the Massachusetts 
position runs counter to the modern trend, which includes the federal 
rule. 15 
7 The Court stated:"[W]here ... the prior convjctions relate to offenses similar to the tort 
at bar, there is an especially serious danger that a jury will disregard limiting instructions and 
allow the convictions to influence their deliberations as substantive evidence." 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 618, 324 N.E.2d at 628. 
8 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 609, 324 N.E.2d at 625. The defendant driver's employer 
was also a defendant. /d. 
9 The records included convictions for driving in a breakdown lane, speeding, opera-
ting under the influence, o_perating to endanger, and leaving the scene of an accident. 
/d. at 612-13, 324 N.E.2d at 626. 
10 /d. at 613, 324 N.E.2d at 626. 
11 I d. 
12 /d. at 614,324 N.E.2d at 626. See Commonwealth v. Arsenault, 361 Mass. 287, 301, 
208 N.E.2d 129, 138 (1972). See also C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF 
EVIDENCE§§ 41-43, at 81-90 (2d ed. 1972); j. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 980, at 828 (Chad-
bourn rev. 1970) (hereinafter cited as WIGMORE); W. LEACH & P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF 
MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 121-26 (4th ed. 1967). 
13 Labrie v. Midwood, 273 Mass. 578, 174 N.E. 214 (1931). 
14 See Walter v. Bonito, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 614-15, 324 N.E.2d at 627. 
u /d. at 614, 324 N.E.2d at 627. See FED. R. Evm. 607. See also UNIFORM EVIDENCE AcT, 
Rule 20, 9A U.L.A. 607 (1965); FED. R. CIV. P. 43(b); J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 899, 
at 663-67. The Court makes clear that if it were faced with a case of first impression, it 
would permit impeachment of one's own witness when the witness is the adverse party. 
1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 614, 324 N.E.2d at 627. 
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The noteworthiness of Walter lies in the Court's finding that the 
error in admitting the convictions was sufficiently prejudicial to re-
quire a new trial, even though the trial judge had given curative, 
limiting instructions to the effect that the convictions were to be used 
only to impeach the defendant's credibility. 16 In reaching this deci-
sion, the Court emphasized the similarity between the behavior in-
volved in the defendant's prior convictions and the behavior that was 
the subject of the instant case-the allegedly negligent driving. Speci-
fically, the Court stated: "[W]here ... the prior convictions related to 
offenses similar to the tort at bar, there is an especially serious danger 
that a jury will disregard limiting instructions and allow the convic-
tions to influence their deliberations as substantive evidence."17 
The holding of Walter is consistent with both the rationale of Justice 
Hennessey's opinion in DiMarzo, and the intuition of many trial 
lawyers, that the jury will frequently consider impeachment evidence 
for substantive purposes, even though they have been instructed 
otherwise. 18 The risk that the jury might misuse the evidence of the 
convictions would appear to increase in relation to the similarity exis-
ting between the behavior for which a witness was previously con-
victed and the behavior that is the gravamen of the case at bar. 19 
Ironically, if the convictions admitted in Walter had been introduced 
against the adverse party after he had taken the stand on his own behalf, 
it appears that under the mandate of section 21 of chapter 233 of the 
General Laws, those convictions would have been admissible regard-
less of the extent of similarity between the prior convictions and the 
case at bar. At the very least, the Court in Walter failed to indicate 
whether a test based upon similarity between convictions and conduct 
at issue will be applied to impeachment material that is otherwise 
properly admitted. 20 
16 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 617, 324 N.E.2d at 628. See also Commonwealth v. Cook, 
351 Mass. 231, 237, 218 N.E.2d 393, 397 (1966). 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 618, 324 N.E 2d at 628. 
18 See also McLaughlin & Leonard, Evidence, 1970 ANN. SuRv. MAss. LAW §27.2, at 
679-81. 
19 By contrast, the rule in the criminal area is that a prior offense (e.g. rape), which 
may be the exact offense now before the jury for consideration, is admissible to im-
peach the defendant's credibility. G.L. c. 233, § 21. See Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 
1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 215,308 N.E.2d 538. Such an admission surely causes the jury to 
conclude that one who did it before has done it again-a conclusion unaffected by any 
instructions seeking to limit unsuccessfully the devastatingly awesome effect of such 
evidence. 
A due process objection to the use of impeachment evidence authorized by G.L. c. 
233, § 21, has consistently been rejected. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Boyd, 1975 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 687, 691-92, 326 N.E.2d 320, 324. 
20 See Commonwealth v. DiMarzo, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 215, 224, 308 N.E.2d 538, 
544; Commonwealth v. West, 357 Mass. 245, 249, 258 N.E.2d 22, 24 (1970). But see 
Carey v. Zayre of Beverly, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 619, 632-33, 324 N.E.2d 619, 624 
(in holding that evidence of certain prior convictions was properly admitted, the Court 
considered the lack of similarity between the convictions and the substantive behavior 
involved). 
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In the second Survey year decision, Carey v. Zayre of Beverly, Inc., 21 
the plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for personal injuries sus-
tained as a result of a fall in the defendant's store, allegedly caused by 
the defendant's negligence. The trial judge allowed the defendant to 
impeach the plaintiff by introducing records of plaintiffs six mis-
demeanor convictions. 22 On appeal from the admission of the convic-
tions, the Supreme Judicial Court held that it was not reversible error 
to admit records of prior misdemeanor convictions to impeach the 
plaintiff. Unlike the situation in Walter, however, where the plaintiff 
called a defendant as his witness,23 the impeached party in Carey took 
the stand in his own behalf.24 In addition, on direct examination, the 
plaintiff admitted to some of the arrests that had resulted in the 
convictions. 25 
In Carey, the plaintiff first raised the issue whether records of his 
prior misdemeanor convictions could be used for impeachment pur-
poses in a civil case where there had been no showing that he was af-
forded the tight to counsel at the prior criminal proceedings. Initially, 
the Court focused on Argersinger v. Hamlin, 26 wherein the United 
States Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment forbids the im-
position of a jail sentence for a misdemeanor unless the defendant is 
represented by counsel or waives his right to representation. 27 The 
Supreme Judicial Court also reviewed Supreme Court decisions hold-
ing, at least as to felonies, that the state cannot impeach a witness 
with evidence of a conviction obtained in violation of the right to 
counsel. 28 This review revealed two defects in the plaintiffs reliance 
on Argersinger. First, Argersinger forbids only the imposition of a jail 
sentence for a misdemeanor conviction where a defendant has been 
denied counsel. In contrast, plaintiffs convictions resulted in nothing 
worse than suspended sentences. The Supreme Judicial Court de-
clined to extend Argersinger to cover that situation.29 Second, much of 
the law applying the exclusionary rule occurs in criminal cases, for the 
21 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 619, 324 N.E.2d 619. 
22 /d. at 619-20,324 N.E.2d at 619. 
23 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 612, 324 N.E.2d at 626. 
24 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 620, 324 N .E.2d at 619-20. 
25 !d., 324 N.E.2d at 619. See Subilosky v. Commonwealth, 358 Mass. 390, 265 N.E.2d 
80 (1970). 
26 407 u.s. 25 (1972). 
27 !d. at 37. Argersinger has been held to apply retroactively. See Berry v. Cincinnati, 
414 u.s. 29 (1973). 
28 Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). See also 
Gilday v. Commonwealth, 355 Mass. 799, 247 N.E.2d 396 (1969); Commonwealth v. 
Barrett, 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 383, 309 N.E.2d 215. 
29 See 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 624-25,324 N.E.2d at 621. Two of the plaintiffs con-
victions had been disposed of with suspended sentences. The Court did not choose be-
tween the divided authorities as to whether such disposition falls within or without the 
aegis of Argersinger. !d. at 623-24, 324 N.E.2d at 621. 
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reason that the government should be deterred from profiting from 
its own illegal conduct. That rationale does not apply in a civil suit, at 
least where the government is not a party. 3° Finally, the Court stated 
that even if it were to extend Argersinger to cover this case, the party 
seeking to exclude his prior conviction would have the burden of proving 
that he was denied counsel. 31 Plaintiff had not met his burden on these 
facts. 
Plaintiff advanced Rule 10 of the General Rules of the Supreme 
Judicial Court, which requires provision of counsel when "imprison-
ment may be imposed,"32 as an additional reason for exclusion of the 
prior convictions. As to this argument, the Court pointed out that the 
plaintiffs constitutional claims were stronger where a mere court rule 
served as the basis for the claim. 33 
After an extensive discussion of the application of constitutional law 
and court rules, the Court concluded that these issues "need not be 
resolved."34 Three of the six convictions would have been admissible 
even if the Court had adopted an extended rule of exclusion by virtue 
of either Argersinger or Rule 10.35 As to the three convictions other-
wise admissible, they predated the adoption of Rule 10 and depended 
on an extension of the right to counsel to cases involving only a fine, 
and special circumstances.36 Again, the Court did not decide whether 
this extension was warranted, because the plaintiff had made no show-
ing that he was denied the right to counsel.37 The convictions in 
which plaintiff may have been denied a right to counsel, said the 
Court, were merely cumulative, thus impliedly of little prejudicial ef-
fect, especially where plaintiff admitted that he had been arrested in 
connection with the convictions.38 
Carey thus indicates that where a prior conviction, for which there is 
some question whether there was a denial of representation, is offered 
for impeachment purposes, the rule of admissibility will depend upon 
whether the forum is civil or criminal. The rule in criminal cases is 
that prior convictions in which the defendant's right to counsel had 
been violated will be excluded.39 Furthermore, in the Commonwealth, 
the prosecution has the burden of showing that there was no violation 
of the defendant's right to counsel in obtaining the prior conviction.40 
30 /d. at 625, 324 N.E.2d at 621. See Note, Constitutional Exclusion of Evidence in Civil 
Litigation, 55 VA. L. REV. 1484 (1969). 
31 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627, 324 N.E.2d at 622. 
32 347 Mass. 809 (1964). See also 355 Mass. 803 (1969) (amendment broadening the 
rule), as amended, S.J.C. R. 3:10. 
33 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627-28, 324 N.E.2d at 622. 
34 /d. at 629, 324 N.E.2d at 623. 
35 /d. 
36 /d. 
37 Id. at 630, 324 N.E.2d at 623. 
38 /d. at 631-32, 324 N.E.2d at 624. 
39 Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). 
40 Gilday v. Commonwealth, 355 Mass. 799, 247 N.E.2d 396 (1969). 
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In civil cases, Carey suggests that it is unlikely that an exclusionary 
rule will be applied at all. Even if a limited exclusionary rule is 
utilized, the burden of demonstrating the illegality of the prior convic-
tion because of lack of proper representation will almost certainly be 
on the person seeking to exclude the evidence.41 
The Court in Carey touches upon the reason for such a distinction. 
The usual rationale for employing the exclusionary rule in criminal 
cases is one of deterrence. The government should not be encouraged 
to engage in illegal conduct by being allowed to employ the fruits 
thereof.42 In a criminal case, the rule would forbid using in a later 
prosecution a conviction obtained against a defendant who was denied 
his right to representation in a previous prosecution. The Court is of 
course correct that the deterrence rationale is inapplicable to a suit be-
tween private parties. 
Nevertheless, there is another rationale for exclusion, which the 
Court discussed only briefly in Carey: the reliability of a conviction 
that has been obtained in violation of the right to counsel. 43 In light 
of the Court's recognition in DiMarzo and Walter that in many in-
stances the convictions will have questionable probity and that they 
may cause disproportionate or even awesome damage to an im-
peached party's case, it is surprising that the Court did not place greater 
emphasis upon the reliability question.44 After stating that "lack of coun-
sel immediately calls into question the reliability and hence the probative 
value of the convictions used," the Court simply sought sanctuary in the 
statement that "the argument for exclusion is weakened by its appearance 
in a civil context."45 
Despite the judicial recognition of the potential inequities of a rule 
of law providing a trial judge with no discretion in limiting the use of 
prior convictions for impeachment purposes, the Walter and Carey 
cases cannot fairly be read to alleviate the problem. The question that 
remains is whether, where impeachment evidence is properly admit-
ted under the broad terms of section 21 of chapter 233 of the Gen-
eral Laws, under what circumstances, if any, will the prejudicial im-
pact of such evidence bring about judicial limitation of Its use? AI-
41 As a pl'actical matter, such information will be more readily accessible to the person 
who was convicted. Carey v. Zayre of Beverly, Inc., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 630, 324 
N .E.2d at 622. 
42 Id. at 625-26, 324 N.E.2d at 621. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Note, Constitutional Exclusion of EVidence in Civi{ 
Litigation, 55 VA. L. _REV. 1484 ( 1969). 
43 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627, 324 N.E.2d at 622. 
44 The Court seemed to recognize this argument in its discussion of Seelig v. Harvard 
Cooperative Soc'y, 355 Mass. 532, 246 N.E.2d 642 (1969) (statements procured in viola-
tion of Miranda warnings held admissible in a civil action), but did not pursue the dis-
tinction between the cases. The Court did note, however, that a violation of Miranda has 
a less direct relation to reliability. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627, 324 N.E.2d at 622. 
45 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 627, 324 N.E.2d at 622. 
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though both Walter and Carey recognize that the potential for prej-
udice is greatest when there is a substantive similarity between the 
conviction record and the crime alleged at trial, they cannot fairly be 
read to establish a rule requiring exclusion of convictions for im-
peachment purposes when such similarity exists. 
§14.5. Implied Admissions: Failure to Call a Witness. In 
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court examined the 
circumstances under which one party's failure to call a witness may 
lead to an inference that the witness would have testified adversely to 
that party's interest. More particularly, Franklin involved a defendant 
who challenged convictions for rape and armed robbery. The Court 
found no prejudicial error in a jury instruction permitting an adverse 
inference to be drawn from the defendant's failure to call any alibi 
witnesses other than his mother. 2 
Although Franklin does not create any new law,3 it is noteworthy 
because it succinctly delineates the factors to be considered by the trial 
judge in determining whether an adverse inference may properly be 
drawn from a party's failure to produce witnesses. The Court indi-
cated that a judge should consider: (1) whether the case against the 
defendant "is so strong that, if innocent, he would be expected to call 
[a witness];" (2) whether the witness is physically available; and (3) 
whether the defendant has greater knowledge of the identity and lo-
cation of the witness than the prosecution.4 With these considerations 
in mind, a judge may find that the defendant's overall position re-
specting such a witness is superior to the prosecution's and that his 
failure to call the witness may be· commented upon. 
After setting forth these guidelines, the Court suggested that caution 
should restrain the trial judge in allowing the inference,5 because it 
could have a substantial prejudicial effect upon the jury's delibera-
tions. The reason for the Court's emphasis on a cautious approach lies 
in the variety of situations in which a defendant may decide not to call 
a witness, even though that witness' testimony would support him. In 
some cases, a witness may not be called by a defendant because his 
vulnerability to cross-examination might outweigh the advantages to 
§14.5. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1483, 318 N.E.2d 469. 
2 I d. at 1493, 318 N.E.2d at 475. The defendant had conceded that such alibi witness-
es existed and were physically available. I d. 
3 The Court, while enunciating the rules of law for general application, id. at 1490, 
318 N.E.2d at 474, invoked the litany that each case must be decided on its own facts, 
id. at 1491, 318 N.E.2d at 475, and cautioned that in this area, "there is no hard and 
fast rule .... " Id. at 1492, 318 N.E.2d at 475. See Commonwealth v. O'Rourke, 311 
Mass. 213, 222, 40 N.E.2d 883, 888 (1942). See also Grady v. Collins Transp. Co., 341 
Mass. 502, 170 N.E.2d 725 (1960); Commonwealth v. Finnerty, 148 Mass. 162, 167, 19 
N.E. 215 (1889). 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1492, 318 N.E.2d at 475. 
5 Id. at 1493, 318 N.E.2d at 476. 
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be gained by his favorable testimony. The Court conceded that some 
explanations that a defendant might offer to a jury for his failure to 
call a witness may be dangerous; 6 to remedy this problem, the Court 
suggested that the reasons supporting a defendant's failure to C!lll a 
witness be explained to the trial judge. 7 
A witness' availability to the defendant, a factor that the Court con-
sidered important in determining the propriety of an adverse 
inference, 8 deserves comment. Franklin indicates that a witness will not 
be considered "available" merely by virtue of a legal or consanguinal 
relationship existing between the defendant and the witness; rather, 
availability or control relate to the "physical availability of the witness, 
and the likelihood that he can be produced by summons or 
otherwise."9 In most cases, control will in practice be determined by 
the defendant's knowledge of the name and address of the potential 
witness and of his availability by summons, although the physical avail-
ability of the witness may not by itself by determinative in deciding 
whether the witness is within the control of the party. 10 Whether or not 
one must look at the relationship between the witness and the party to 
determine the requisite control was left for enunciation in future cases. 
Later in the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Happnie, 11 the Appeals 
Court applied the Franklin rule overzealously. In Happnie, a witness 
for the Commonwealth testified that the defendant had discussed the 
robbery, in the presence of both herself and the defendant's wife, on 
two separate occasions.12 There was no evidence regarding the "physi-
cal whereabouts" of defendant's wife. 13 
In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor commented 
upon the defendant's failure to call his wife to rebut the testimony of 
the Commonwealth's witness.14 The trial judge instructed the jury that 
if they found that defendant's wife was available, but not called, it 
would be permissible to infer that her testimony would not be favorable to 
8 /d. 
7 /d. at 1493-94, 318 N.E.2d at 476. See Commonwealth v. Happnie, 1975 Mass. App. 
Ct. Adv. Sh. 554, 326 N.E.2d 25. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1492, 318 N.E.2d at 475. 
9 /d. 
1° Commonwealth v. Happnie, 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 554, 558-59, 326 N.E.2d 
25, 28. 
11 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 554, 326 N.E.2d 25. 
12 /d. at 555, 326 N.E.2d at 27. 
13 /d. cf. Commonwealth v. Spencer, 212 Mass. 438, 452, 99 N.E. 266, 272 (1912) 
(defendant's wife present in court during trial). 
14 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 555, 326 N.E.2d at 27. The defendant did not tes-
tify. Id. Comment on a defendant's failure to testify is, of course, violative of his fifth 
amendment right against self-incrimination. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 
(1965). 
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defendani 15 On appeal, the defendant argued that no showing that his 
wife was physically available to testify had been made. 16 
In affirming the conviction, the Appeals Court ruled that there was 
no error in either the prosecutor's comment or the trial judge's 
charge, and that an inference adverse to the defendant could be 
drawn from his failure to produce his wife or offer an explanation for 
her absence. 17 The implication of this holding is that a defendant now 
has the burden of showing why he has not produced a witness. In 
short, the Appeals Court has fashioned the Franklin suggestion that 
defendant explain the reason for a witness' absence into a rule of 
evidence-namely, that failure to meet the burden of explaining the 
absence of a witness permits a jury to infer that the witness was avail-
able to the defendant. 
The Happnie requirement ignores the Court's acknowlegment in 
Franklin that, at times, "it may be tactically unwise for the defendant 
to offer explanation to the jury of the reasons for his failure to pro-
duce the witness."18 In Happnie, for e·xample, the existence of the 
relationship of marriage between defendant and witness did not 
compel a jury conclusion that the witness was available to the defen-
dant. To permit the judge to instruct the jury that they may draw 
such an inference is to require the defendant to make an explanation to a 
judge for the witness' unavailability. 
The Franklin and Happnie cases may have created more problems 
than they settled. If, for example, in his closing argument a pros-
ecutor comments on the absence of a defendant's wife and, there-
after, the defendant approaches the trial judge to indicate that his 
wife is hospitalized and dying of cancer, the court surely will not in-
struct the jury that it may draw an adverse inference from the wife's 
absence. Must the court grant a mistrial or, instead, in order to avoid 
prejudice, permit defense counsel to make this explanation to the 
jury, thereby injecting irrelevant sympathy into the case? 19 These 
unanswered questions are left for future resolution in the wake of 
Happnie and Franklin. The existence of such questions provides an 
atmosphere in which the imaginative defense counsel senses occasions 
for reversible error. 
§14.6. Attorney-Client Privilege. The principle that communica-
tions between an attorney and his client that are intended to be made 
public are not privileged was the basis for decision in two cases de-
15 1975 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 555-56, 326 N.E.2d at 27. 
16 /d. at 556, 326 N.E.2d at 27. 
17 /d. at 561, 326 N.E.2d at 29. 
18 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1493, 318 N.E.2d at 476. 
19 If the court allows the latter course, it is permitting the defense to introduce "evi-
dence" without testimony. 
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cided during the Survey year. 1 In Peters v. Wallach, 2 a suit in equity to 
enforce a settlement agreement, the defendants argued that their at-
torney could not be shown to have had the authority to settle the case, 
because the only evidence of such authority was inadmissible under 
the attorney-client privilege. 3 Since the clients' grant of authority to 
settle must of necessity be communicated to the other party, the Court 
held that it was not privileged. 4 
Commonwealth v. Michel5 involved an attempt to cross-examine a 
codefendant as to possible bias stemming from an arrangement with 
the prosecution, which included a provision that the indictment 
against him in the instant case would be nol prossed.6 Since all negoti-
ations between the codefendant and the prosecutor's office had been 
conducted through the codefendant's attorney, the trial judge ruled 
that information as to the arrangement communicated by the attorney 
was privileged.7 The Supreme Judicial Court, however, held that al-
though an attorney's advice whether to accept an offer would be 
privileged, the communication of the terms of the offer, already 
known to the prosecution and likely to be presented to the court, is 
not so privileged. 8 
§14.7 .. Scientific Evidence: Results of Breathalyzer Test. In Com-
monwealth v. Brooks, 1 the Supreme Judicial Court corrected a legislative 
oversight to avoid undermining the statute that concerns the admis-
sion into evidence of breathalyzer tests.2 Section 24(1)(e) of chapter 90 
of the General Laws permits the introduction of "evidence of the per-
centage, by weight, of alcohol in the defendant's blood .... "3 Although 
the defendant in Brooks had voluntarily submitted to a breathalyzer 
test,4 he challenged the introduction into evidence of the results of 
that test, on the theory that the breathalyzer machine that produced 
the results measured the percentage of alcohol in the defendant's 
blood by volume. 5 The Court, after engaging in a lengthy historical re-
§14.6. 1 Peters v. Wallach, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 61, 321 N.E.2d 806; Commonwealth 
v. Michel, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. ll08, 327 N.E.2d 720. 
2 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 61, 321 N.E.2d 806. 
3 /d. at 68, 321 N.E.2d at 809. 
4 /d. at 69, 321 N.E.2d at 809. 
5 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1108, 327 N.E.2d 720. 
6 /d. at 1114, 327 N.E.2d at 723. 
1Jd. 
8 /d. at 1116-17, 327 N.E.2d at 724. 
§14.7. 1 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2196, 319 N.E.2d 901. See also Commonwealth v. Bern-
ier, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 221, 322 N.E.2d 414. 
2 G.L. c. 90, § 24(l)(e). 
3 /d. (emphasis added). 
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2196, 319 N.E.2d at 902. 
5 /d. at 2198, 319 N.E.2d at 903. 
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view of the role of alcohol in vehicular accidents,6 and in the semanti-
cal niceties of statutory construction, 7 concluded that the statute re-
quires that the alcohol content of the blood be measured only in a 
weight/volume percentage, not in a weight/weight percentage.8 The 
measurement is to be expressed in terms of grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters or cubic centimeters of blood, not in terms of milligrams of 
alcohol per 100 milligrams of blood. 9 Because the test administered to 
the defendant was calibrated in the former measurements, the results 
of the test were held to be properly admitted into evidence.10 
STuDENT CoMMENT 
§14.8. Admissibility of Expert Testimony Based on Voice Spec-
trograms: Commonwealth v. Lykus. 1 Paul Cavalieri disappeared on 
November 2, 1972. Two days later his family received a telephone call 
demanding a ransom payment. This call was followed by four similar 
calls, which were recorded by police with the permission of the 
Cavalieris. On April 12, 1973, the remains of a body later identified 
as that of Paul Cavalieri were found. Edward Lykus was subsequently 
tried before a jury on three indictments which charged him with the 
kidnapping and first degree murder of Paul Cavalieri, and with extor-
tion from Cavalieri's father. 2 
A portion of the evidence offered by the prosecution at trial was 
expert testimony, based in part on voice spectrograms,3 that the voice 
on the recorded extortionate calls was that of the defendant. The trial 
judge's ruling on the admissibility of this testimony was preceded by 
an extensive voir dire hearing at which experts for both parties tes-
tified. Lieutenant Ernest W. Nash of the Michigan State Police De-
6 Id. at 2198-2200, 319 N.E.2d at 903-04. See Newman, Proof of Alcoholic Intoxication, 
34 KY. L.J. 250 (1946); Watts, Some Observations on Police-Administered Tests for Intoxica-
tion, 45 N.C.L. REV. 34 (1966). 
7 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2202-04, 319 N .E.2d at 904-05. For example, the Court 
applied the rule that words in a statute must be considered in light of the other words 
surrounding them. Id. See Animal Rescue League v. Assessors of Bourne, 310 Mass. 
330, 333, 37 N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (1941). The Court also applied the rule that a statute 
should be interpreted to be effective for the purpose for which it was enacted. 1974 
Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2209, 319 N.E.2d at 905. See A. Belanger & Sons, Inc. v. Joseph M. 
Concannon Corp., 333 Mass. 22, 25, 127 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1955). 
8 197 4 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2202-03, 319 N .E.2d at 905. 
9 Id. at 2210, 319 N.E.2d at 907. 
10 Id., 319 N.E.2d at 908. 
§14.8. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 719, 327 N.E.2d 671. 
2 I d. at 719-20, 327 N.E.2d at 672. 
3 The term "voiceprint identification," the popular name for the process used in 
Lykus, will not be used in this note because it suggests a similarity to fingerprint identifi-
cation. Although the two processes are similar in some superficial aspects, such an anal-
ogy is entirely unwarranted at this time. See note 77 infra. 
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partment, whose expert testimony was to be offered at trial, testified 
at length in favor of admissibility. His testimony was supported by 
that of Dr. Oscar Tosi, a professor of psychoacoustics, acoustics, 
phonetics, and physics at Michigan State University.4 Dr. Louis 
Gerstman, a professor of psychology and of speech and hearing sci-
ences at City College of the City University of New York, 5 testified for 
the defense in opposition to the introduction of spectrographic evi-
dence. 
On the basis of the testimony at voir dire, the trial judge held the 
spectrographic identification admissible in evidence. Defendant Lykus 
was convicted on all charges, and appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court on the sole issue whether the trial judge properly admitted the 
spectrographic evidence. After reviewing the evidence at voir dire, 
cases from other jurisdictions, and relevant scientific articles, the 
Court HELD: Spectrographic identification has received general ac-
ceptance within the relevant scientific community and is, therefore, 
properly admissible under careful scrutiny. 6 
The Supreme Judicial Court thus joined the small but growing 
number of appellate courts7 that have permitted the admission of ex-
pert testimony based on spectrographic analysis. Although other ap-
pellate courts have held spectrographic evidence admissible, many of 
them8 did not apply the standard for admission that was purportedly 
applied by the Court in Lykus. The test applied by the Supreme Judi-
cial Court was a modification of the traditional standard for the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence. The traditional standard was first 
enunciated in Frye v. United States: 9 "[W]hile courts will go a long way 
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well recognized scien-
tific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is 
made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance 
in the particular field in which it belongs."10 
Massachusetts adopted the Frye test as its own standard for the ad-
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 724, 327 N.E.2d at 673. 
5 !d. at 724, 327 N.E.2d at 674. 
6 /d. at 736-37, 327 N.E.2d at 678-79. The Court placed the following limitation on 
the full admissibility of spectrographic evidence: 
We add that the admission of expert testimony as to spectrographic analysis should 
be subject to the closest of judicial scrutiny, particularly in any case where there is 
an absence of evidence of voice identification other than that of the voiceprint or 
where, but for the voiceprint, there would be insufficient evidence to warrant any 
inference of the defendant's guilt. 
/d. at 737-38, 327 N.E.2d at 679. 
7 See cases cited in note 49, infra. 
8 See, e.g., Alea v. State, 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Worley v. State, 263 
So.2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 
192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). 
9 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
10 /d. at 1014 (emphasis added). 
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missibility of scientific evidence in Commonwealth v. Fatalo.U A varia-
tion of this standard was developed by the California Court of Ap-
peals in People v. Williams, 12 where the court held that all that is neces-
sary to satisfy Frye is general acceptance of a technique "by those who 
would be expected to be familiar with its use."13 This modified ver-
sion of the Frye rule was applied in Lykus. 14 Thus, acceptance was re-
quired only by those who were familiar with the use of spectrographic 
identification, rather than by an entire scientific field. The Williams 
modification seems particularly appropriate for spectrographic iden-
tification because the spectrographic technique, being related to such 
disparate disciplines as phonetics and electronics, does not belong to 
an identifiable scientific field. 
This casenote will begin with an explanation of the technique of 
spectrographic voice identification and then will examine the experi-
mental results offered in support of the reliability of the technique. 
The Lykus opinion itself will then be analyzed, with particular em-
phasis on two questions: (1) whether the Frye standard of general ac-
ceptance by the relevant scientific community was satisfied in Lykus, 
and (2) whether the general acceptance standard should have been 
applied to the spectrographic evidence involved in Lykus. It will be 
submitted that the Frye standard was not satisfied in Lykus and that, 
even if it was satisfied, the general acceptance standard should not 
have been applied in the first instance. 
The first step involved in the spectrographic voice identification 
process used in Lykus is to obtain a voice exemplar from an 
individual.1 5 Certain words (cue words) or sounds are extracted from 
11 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963). 
12 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958). 
13 !d. at 862, 331 P.2d at 254. Williams dealt with the admissibility of the results of a 
Nalline test to detect the recent use of narcotics. The prosecution introduced favorable 
expert testimony, but each of the experts admitted on cross examination that the medi-
cal profession generally was unfamiliar with the technique and therefore it could not 
truthfully be said that the technique had acquired general acceptance by the medical 
profession as a whole. /d. at 861-62, 331 P.2d at 253. Since many people in the medical 
profession would never become familiar with such a specialized technique, the evidence 
would never be admissible under a strict interpretation of Frye. Thus, the court held 
that general acceptance was required only by those in the specialized field dealing with 
the narcotics problem and not by the medical profession as a whole. /d. at 862, 331 P.2d at 
254. 
•• 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 735, 327 N.E.2d at 678. 
15 In Lykus, the exemplar was obtained voluntarily. Brief for Defendant at 29. In sev-
eral cases, however, exemplars have been obtained without the consent or even the 
knowledge of the defendant. See, e.g., People v. King, 21)6 Cal. App.2d 437, 441, 72 
Cal. Rptr. 478, 481 (1968); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 444, 192 
N.W.2d 432, 433 (1971). For a discussion of the constitutional issues involved in obtain-
ing a voice exemplar from an individual see Note, Vqiceprint Identification, 61 GEo. L. J. 
703, 727-44 (1972). The Supreme Court settled some of these constitutional issues in 
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1972). In Dionisio, a grand jury subpoenaed about 
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this exemplar and scanned electronically by a high speed sound 
spectrograph.16 The spectrograph then produces a sound spectro-
gram, which is a visible graph of the frequency and amplitude of the 
sound or sounds over time. 17 An examiner compares this visual dis-
play with spectrograms of identical words or sounds spoken by an un-
known individual. In addition to analyzing the visual displays of the 
samples to be compared, the examiner listens to the two voices. 18 On 
the basis of this visual and aural comparison, the examiner decides 
whether the two exemplars were produced by the same person. 
This identification decision is necessarily subjective because the 
voice of an individual is not invariant; in fact, no person ever utters 
the same word or sound twice with all of the spectrographic charac-
teristics remaining exactly alike. 19 Thus, the examiner must decide 
whether similar but not identical spectrograms represent the same 
word spoken on different occasions by the same speaker (intraspeaker 
variability) or the same word spoken by different speakers (inter-
speaker variability).2° Consequently, the reliability of an identification 
or an elimination depends to a great degree on the experience and 
the qualifications of the examiner. 
Although spectrographic identification is a subjective technique, a 
remarkable rate of correct identifications was obtained through the 
use of the method in a recent experiment by Dr. Oscar Tosi and his 
associates at Michigan State University.21 This experiment has been 
the watershed event for admission of spectrographic evidence in crim-
inal litigation in the United States. 
The Tosi experiment, which was accorded considerable weight by 
the Court in Lykus, 22 investigated the reliability of the spectrographic 
identification technique by varying a number of factors that affect 
normal criminal investigations. Spectrograms were obtained from 250 
college-age American males who spoke the same dialect. Among the 
variables examined in the study were the number of cue words, their 
20 persons to give voice exemplars for identification purposes. The Court held that 
compelling production of the exemplars did not violate the defendants' Fifth Amend-
ment rights because the exemplars were to be used for identification purposes rather 
than for their testimonial content. Id. at 7. The Court also held that compulsory pro-
duction of the exemplars did not violate defendants' Fourth Amendment rights because 
that Amendment provides no protection for what is knowingly exposed to the public. 
Id. at 14. 
16 For a technical discussion of the spectrograph it&elf, see Presti, High-Speed Sound 
Spectrograph, 40 J. AcousTICAL SoC'Y AM. 628 ( 1966). 
17 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 726, 327 N.E.2d at 674. 
18 Tosi, Oyer, Lashbrook, Pedrey, Nicol and Nash, Experiment on Voice Identifu:ation, 51 
J. AcousTICAL SoC'Y AM. 2030, 2031-32 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Experiment]. 
1& Id. 
•o I d. 
21 Experiment, supra note 18. 
22 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 731, 327 N.E.2d at 676. 
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context, the number of known speakers, the amount of background 
noise, the time lapse between production of the two spectrograms, 
and the use of either closed or open trials. 23 Examiners were given 
one month of training in basic speech principles and in spectro-
graphic interpretation. During the experiment the examiners were al-
lowed fifteen minutes to evaluate either six or nine pairs of spectrograms 
and to come to a positive conclusion of either identification or elimi-
nation. Although they were forced to make a decision in each case, 
examiners were allowed to rate the degree of confidence they had in 
their decision. Visual comparison of the spectrograms was the only al-
lowable means of identification; they were not allowed to compare the 
voices aurally. 
In the situations that most closely correspond to those encountered 
in criminal cases-open trials, 24 noncontemporaneous spectrograms, 25 
and cue words in a fixed or random context26- Tosi found a false 
identification rate27 of 6%. 28 When the confidence ratings were taken 
into account, Tosi found that a false identification rate of 2% would 
23 Experiment, supra note 18, at 2033. A closed trial is one in which the examiner 
knows that a matching spectrogram is among those to be examined. Thus, a closed trial 
is essentially an elimination process. Open trials, on the other hand, are trials in which 
the examiner does not know whether a matching spectrogram is present and thus can-
not use the elimination process to arrive at a conclusion. Jd. 
24 See note 23 supra. The examiner will not know in any criminal case whether the 
voice of the criminal will be among the voices of the suspects. Thus, open trials approx-
imate the real situation more closely than closed trials. 
25 Since a voice exemplar is usually obtained some time after the original spectro-
gram, noncontemporaneous experimental situations, in which spectrogams are obtained 
at different times, are more relevant to actual cases than contemporaneous situations. 
See, e.g., State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 552, 296 A.2d 644, 648 (1972), where the ex-
emplars were to be taken five years after the original spectrogram was produced. In 
cases where there is a great lapse of time between spectrograms, the effects of aging on 
the voice become important. See Endres, Bambach, and Flosser, Voice Spectrograms as a 
Function of Age, Voice Disguise, and Voice Imitation, 49 ]. AcousTICAL Socv AM. 1842 
(1971). 
26 Context of the cue words is important because of the effect of the sounds spoken 
before and after the cue word on the spectral content of the cue word. A recent exper-
iment has suggested that identification is always more difficult when the cue word is in 
context than when it is spoken in isolation. B. Hazen, Effects of Differing Phonetic Contexts 
on Spectrographic Speaker Jdenti[zcation, 54 ]. AcousTICAL Socv AM. 650, 657 (1973) 
[hereinafter cited as Effects]. Both fixed and random context situations are relevant to 
actual cases, depending on the content of the voice exemplar. In some cases the content 
of the exemplar is entirely unrelated to that of the original taped conversation. In other 
cases, such as Lykus, the defendant is instructed to speak some or all of the same words 
found on the original tape, thus ensuring that the context of the words to be compared 
will be identical on both tapes. Brief for Defendant at 29. 
27 Although there were several types of error for which rates were computed, 
Experiment, supra note 18, at 2036, the false identification rate is the only significant one 
for legal purposes. 
28 Experiment, supra note 18, at 2041. 
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have been obtained if the examiners had been allowed to express no 
opinion when uncertain. 29 
It is Tosi's opinion that the error rate will decrease when the pro-
cess is applied in an actual case. He has presented several reasons to 
support this conclusion.3° First, although the experimental examiners 
were given only fifteen minutes to come to a decision, the professional 
examiner will have as much time as necessary to reach a conclusion. 
Second, the professional examiner will have qualifications and 
training31 that exceed those of the experimental examiners. Third, 
the professional examiner, unlike the examiners in the experiment, is 
not obligated to make a decision. Fourth, the professional examiner 
will be able to use as many cue words as he deems necessary to make 
a decision, whereas the experimental examiners were limited to dther 
six or nine cue words. Fifth, the professional examiner will be allowed 
to listen to the voices as well as to compare them visually. All of these 
factors, according to Dr. Tosi, will tend to increase the reliability of 
the result in an actual case.32 
Despite the high rate of accuracy found in the experiment, Dr. 
Tosi's application of the results to actual cases has been criticized as 
being premature.33 Dr. Peter Ladefoged, a recent convert to the Tosi 
position,34 has cautioned that three important variables were not 
taken into account in the Tosi experiment. 35 The first of these vari-
ables is the sex of the speaker. Dr. Tosi's experiment dealt exclusively 
with male voices, but, according to Dr. Ladefoged, the higher pitch of 
female voices makes them harder to compare spectrographically.38 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 2042. The Court in Lykus seemed to find.Dr. Tosi's testimony to this effect 
very persuasive. 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 732, 327 N.E.2d at 677. 
31 To ensure that the qualifications and training of professional examiners are ade-
quate, the nonprofit International Association of Voice Identification was established in 
1971. Black, Lashbrook, Nash, Oyer, Pedrey, Tosi and Truby, Reply to "Speaker Identifi-
cation by Speech Spectrograms: Some Further Ooservations," 54 J. AcousTICAL Soc·v AM. 535, 
536 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Reply]. 
31 Experiment, supra note 18, at 2042. 
33 Effects, supra note 2,6, at 659; Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Pickett, and Stevens, 
Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: Some Further Observations, 54 j. AcoUSTICAL 
Soc'Y AM. 531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Observations]. 
a• Dr. Ladefoged had testified against admissibility of spectrographic evidence in sev-
eral early cases, see, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App.2d 437, 454, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 
489 (1968); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 455, 192 N.W.2d 432, 439 
(1971), but has changed his position since the publication of Tosi's study. See United 
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, the reservations ex-
pressed by Ladefoged prompted the Addisan court to characterize his conversion as a 
"limited one," more·an "abatement of skepticism" than a complete acceptance.Id. at 744-45. 
33 See People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974); State ex ret. 
Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). 
38 State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 456, 192 N.W.2d 432, 440 (1971). 
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The other two omitted variables, disguise and mimicry,37 seem to be 
related. Disguise of the suspect's voice would be more important in a 
criminal investigation than in a legal proceeding because it would 
most likely lead only to an improper elimination of a suspect. 
Mimicry, on the other hand, is of profound significance in a legal 
proceeding because it could lead to an improper identification of a sus-
pect. It does not seem very probable that the courts would allow spec-
trographic analysis into evidence if it were shown that the process was 
unable to distinguish a suspect's voice from that of a skilled mimic. 
Other critics of Dr. Tosi's experiment have noted several more vari-
ables that could affect the application of his results to actual cases, but 
were not considered in the experimental design.38 Instead of answer-
ing these criticisms directly, Tosi has merely reiterated his unproven 
hypotheses as to why reliability will increase in actual cases.39 Criticism 
of Tosi's experiment does not center on the validity of his results, but 
focuses instead on his premature application of those results to actual 
cases. The critics point out that further studies are needed before the 
technique should be applied in a legal context. 40 Although Tosi has 
admitted that further studies are needed in the area of spectrographic 
identification,41 he feels that his results are sufficiently complete at the 
present time to warrant forensic application of the technique.42 
In deciding whether the spectrographic evidence offered in Lykus 
was admissible the Court purported to apply the Frye standard of 
general acceptance in the particular field to which a technique 
37 See People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 80, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 715 (1974). 
38 In addition to disguise and mimicry, variables not investigated included room 
acoustics, recording conditions, and chan'ges in the psychological state of the speaker. 
Observations, supra note 33, at 532-33. The latter variable could have a substantial effect 
in a criminal case because of the psychological stress that a defendant might experieQce 
if compelled to produce an exemplar. Recent studies have suggested that the spectral 
content of a person's speech changes in conjunction with his emotional state. Williams 
and Stevens, Emotions and Speech: Some Acoustical Correlates, 52 J. AcoUSTICAL SOC'Y 
AM. 1238 (1972); Hecker, Stevens, von Bismarck, and Williams, Manifestations of 
Task-Induced Stress in the Acoustic Speech Signal, 44 J. AcoUSTICAL SOC'Y AM. 993 (1968). 
One author has suggested that these issues should be explored in court, but this ap-
proach should not be adopted until further experimentation has been carried out on 
the effects of voice mimicry, a variable that brings the validity of the entire technique 
into question. Greene, Voice Identification: The Case In Favor of Admissibility, 13 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv.171, 194 (1975). 
39 Reply, supra note 31, at 536. 
40 Effects, supra note 26, at 659; Observations, supra note 33, at 533-34. 
41 With respect to mimicked and disguised voices, Dr. Tosi has testified: "I think 
more research is welcome and should be done and I intend to do more research." Peo-
ple v. Law, 49 Cal. App. 3d 69, 78, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714 (1974). 
42 Dr. Tosi has also testified: "In mimicking it's possible that more research will 
clarify, will bring more figures to the thing. But, in other cases I don't think that- I feel that 
the research is completed." People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 79, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708, 714 
(1974). 
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belongs. 43 The Court based its conclusion on an examination of deci-
sions from other jurisdictions, relevant scientific articles, and the evi-
dence at voir dire concerning the reliability and general acceptance of 
the technique.44 Justice Kaplan pointed out several flaws in the 
majority's reasoning and dissented on the ground that the Frye 
standard had not been satisfied. 45 
In reaching its conclusion that the Frye test had been met in Lykus, 
the Court noted the growing acceptance of the technique by appellate 
courts that had considered the admissibility issue since the Tosi 
study.46 In his dissenting opinion, however, Justice Kaplan pointed 
out that many of the cases had been decided before the scientific 
community had had enough time to study Dr. Tosi's results and to 
react to themY The recent reaction of the scientific community, ac-
cording to Justice Kaplan, had been prevailingly negative. 48 Nonethe-
less, the reaction of the courts to Dr. Tosi's study has been over-
whelmingly favorable, both prior and subsequent to the Lykus 
decision. 49 
43 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 725, 327 N.E.2d at 674. 
44 /d. at 736, 327 N.E.2d at 678. 
45 !d. at 741, 327 N.E.2d at 680. 
46 Id. at 728-29, 327 N.E.2d at 675. There were three appellate decisions on the sub-
ject prior to the Tosi study. In United States v. Wright, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183 (1967), a 
case that involved identification of the maker of obscene telephone calls, the United 
States Court of Military Appeals held that spectrographic identification of the defen-
dant by Mr. Lawrence Kersta, the developer of the technique, was admissible. The 
court reasoned that since aural comparison by the court members was possible, they 
could determine for themselves the margin of error in Mr. Kersta's opinion. Id. at 189. 
State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), on remand, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 
A.2d 680 (1968), appeal granted, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), afj'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 
A.2d 209 (1970), was a murder case in which the state sought to compel the defendant 
to produce a voice exemplar for spectrographic comparison by Kersta. After the case 
made several trips to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the spectrographic evidence was 
held inadmissible because the technique was not generally accepted by the scientific 
community. 99 N.J. Super. at 334, 239 A.2d at 685. 
In People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968), the prosecution 
sought to identify defendant as the man who made incriminating statements on a televi-
sion interview. Visual identification was impossible because network personnel refused 
to identify the man on the film, invoking the newsman's privilege under California law. 
The Court held the spectrographic evidence inadmissible because of the lack of general 
acceptance of the technique and because of Kersta's lack of expert qualifications. Id. at 
460, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 493. 
47 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 743, 327 N.E.2d at 680. 
48 /d. 
49 See United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975); United States v. Franks, 
511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975); Hodo v. Superior Court, 
30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973); People v. Watson, Cal. App. 3d Dist. 
(May 7, 1973) (unreported); Alea v. State, 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Wor-
ley v. State, 263 So.2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 
291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 
(1972). Contra, United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Law, 
40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974). For a list of trial court decisions on the 
admissibility of spectrographic voice identification testimony, see Greene, Voiceprint Iden-
tification: The Case In Favor Of Admissibility, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 171, 184-85 n.66 (1975). 
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The Supreme Judicial Court's focus on decisions in other jurisdic-
tions was not particularly apposite, however, because three of the four 
published decisions50 favoring admissibility did not apply the Frye 
standard of general acceptance within the relevant scientific commun-
ity that the Court purportedly applied in Lykus. For example, in State 
ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 51 the first case to consider the admissibility 
of spectrographic evidence after publication of the Tosi study, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota applied the traditional rule for admis-
sion of expert testimony rather than the Frye rule for admission of 
scientific evidence.52 The Court held that spectrographic evidence was 
admissible for the purpose of corroborating opinions based on aural 
comparison alone. 53 The Florida District Court of Appeals also held 
spectrographic evidence admissible for corroborative purposes in 
Worley v. State 5 4 and A lea v. State, 55 but did not apply Frye. 
Prior to the Lykus decision itself, the California Court of Appeals, in 
Hodo v. Superior Court, 56 was the only appellate court that had held af-
firmatively that spectrographic identification had acquired general ac-
ceptance with the relevant scientific community. However, in People v. 
Law, 57 the California Court of Appeals for another district suggested 
in dicta that the technique in general did not have the requisite accep-
tance within the relevant scientific community.58 The court went on to 
hold that with respect to disguised and mimicked voices in particular, 
the technique had not gained general acceptance in the scientific 
50 Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973); Alea v. 
State, 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Worley v. State, 263 So.2d 613 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1972); State ex ret. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 
(1971). The Supreme Judicial Court mentioned that State v. Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 
A.2d 644 (1972) supported its conclusion, but that case did not deal specifically with the 
issue of admissibility of spectrographic evidence. Because the narrow question in 
Andretta was whether the defendants could be compelled to produce voice exemplars, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court chose not to reconsider its previous rejection of spec-
trographic evidence in State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343, 230 A.2d 384 (1967), on remand, 99 
N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680 (1968), appeal granted, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15 (1969), 
affd., 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1970), until the question of admissibility is squarely 
presented to the court again. 61 N.J. at 551-52, 296 A.2d at 648. Nevertheless, the 
court seemed to suggest that it was now favorably disposed to the technique and or-
dered that the defendants be required to produce voice exemplars. /d. 
51 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). 
52 /d. at 456, 192 N.W.2d at 440. The court stated that opinions of qualified experts 
are admitted only to aid the factfinder.in a field where he has no particular knowledge 
or training, and the weight to be given to the opinion of an expert lies entirely with the 
factfinder. I d. 
5 3 /d. at 457, 192 N.W.2d at 441. 
54 263 So.2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
55 265 So.2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
56 30 Cal. App. 3d 778, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973). 
57 40 Cal. App. 3d 69, 114 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1974). 
58 /d. at 84, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 718. 
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community and was, therefore, inadmissible.59 In addition, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had recently 
given a strict interpretation to its own Frye standard in United States v. 
Addison, 60 holding spectrographic evidence inadmissible because the 
technique had not attained the requisite general acceptance of the sci-
entific community.61 The decisions from other jurisdictions, then, did 
not lend a great deal of support to the Supreme Judicial Court's con-
clusion that Frye had been satisfied. 
After reviewing the relevant decisions from other jurisdictions, the 
Court proceeded to a discussion of the evidence at voir dire. The 
Court summarized Dr. Tosi's results and listed his reasons for his 
conclusion that a professional examiner will achieve more reliable re-
sults than the laboratory examiners.62 Justice Kaplan, in his dissent, 
pointed out that Dr. Tosi's conclusion has no experimental support. 63 
Nonetheless, the Court evaluated the opinions of the critics in light of 
Dr. Tosi's unproven hypotheses and concluded with the following re-
markable statement: "To the extent that a convincing case is made, as 
in this case, that the professional examiner will achieve more reliable 
results than the laboratory examiner, then to that extent the opposi-
tion can be discounted."64 
The Court's position in this regard is highly questionable. The 
Court was merely being called upon to decide whether a significant 
controversy existed, and yet it seemed to be interposing itself as the 
arbiter of the dispute. Surely this is not what the framers of the Frye 
standard had in mind when they determined that general acceptance 
should be the test. When applying Frye the Court should not find that 
a scientific principle is generally accepted simply because the Court 
considers the opinions of critics unfounded. If that method of deter-
mining general acceptance is used, one of the primary goals of the 
Frye test-that only qualified experts, and not judges, will assess the 
validity of a scientific process65-will be destroyed. It is submitted, 
then, that the Court's process of discounting the opinions of critical 
experts because of the convincing nature of Dr. Tosi's presentation 
was an improper application of the Frye test. 
The Court also discounted views of the critical experts at another 
point in the opinion, ostensibly for a different reason. After discus-
sing the Williams variation of the Frye standard-general acceptance of 
a technique "by those who would be expected to be familiar with its 
•• !d. 
60 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
81 !d. at 745. 
82 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 732-33, 327 N.E.2d at 677. 
83 /d. at 746 n.7, 327 N.E.2d at 681 n.7. 
84 /d. at 733, 327 N.E.2d at 677. 
85 See text accompanying note 83 infra. 
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use"66-the Court stated in a footnote: "In this case we are disposed 
to give greater weis-ht to those experts who have had direct and em-
pirical experience m the field of spectrography."67 Apparently, the 
Court was defining those who would be expected to be familiar with 
the use of spectrography to include only those with direct and empiri-
cal experience with the technique. Opinions of experts in related 
fields, such as acoustics, phonetics, speech and speech therapy, were 
discounted, even though those experts may have been familiar with 
the technique. 68 
Unfortunately, the Court did not explain why the opinions of those 
without empirical experience should be discounted. Justice Kaplan 
noted that in most scientific fields it is common for experts to review 
an experiment in light of their broad theoretical knowledge. 69 He 
added that it could not be plausibly said that the critical experts were 
either unqualified to have opinions worthy of respect or strangers to 
the relevant scientific field. The Court seemed to find additional com-
fort in the fact that one of the critical articles is only a "theoretical re-
view of the Tosi report and is in the form merely of a four page letter 
.•.• " 70 Surely the theoretical nature of these criticisms does not ren-
der them any less substantive, nor does their brevity reduce their 
value. 
As a practical matter, the Court's process of discounting opinions of 
experts with little or no empirical experience in spectrography was 
dispositive in Lykus because of the limited number of persons with 
empirical experience in the field. Since Dr. Tosi's study was one of 
the first large-scale experiments done in the field of spectrography, 
the group of experts "who would be expected to be familiar with its 
use" became, in essence, the participants in the Tosi study, who could 
hardly be characterized as disinterested in the forensic application of 
the technique. General acceptance by these experts was not difficult to 
find. 
The Court suggested in dictum that the purported reliability of the 
spectrographic technique also supported its conclusion that the Frye 
standard had been satisfied. 71 Other courts have focused on the relia-
bility of the technique as an important factor in the admissibility 
66 See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra. 
67 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 736-37 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 678 n.6. 
68 The Williams variation was developed to exclude only the opinions of those who 
were totally ignorant of the technique, and not the opinions of experts who were famil-
iar with the technique in general but who had no empirical experience. See note 13 
supra. 
69 /d. at 747 n.IO, 327 N.E.2d at 682 n.10. 
70 /d. at 737 n.6, 327 N.E.2d at 679 n.6. 
71 Id. at 736, 327 N.E.2d at 678. 
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decision, 72 but these courts were not applying Frye. The emphasis on 
reliability would seem to be misplaced if the Court was really applying 
the Frye standard because reliability is irrelevant under Frye. In fact, in 
Addison, the court that first promulgated the Frye rule disapproved the 
trial court's emphasis on reliability, 73 since general acceptance of the 
claimed reliability is ~he only criterion for admissibility under Frye. 
It is submitted, then, that the Court's finding of general acceptance 
of spectrography under Frye and Fatalo is highly questionable. Most 
jurisdictions that admitted Lt. Nash's testimony did not hold that the 
technique had gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific 
community. In addition, the Court's practice of discounting the opin-
ions of critical experts seems highly improper under Frye. Even if the 
practice of discounting opinions were proper, the Court did not ade-
quately explain why the critical opinions should have been discounted. 
The reliability of the technique also failed to support the Court's con-
clusion because reliability is irrelevant under Frye. 
Quite apart from the question of whether the Frye standard was 
satisfied in Lykus is whether Frye should have been applied at all. The 
Frye test applies only to evidence based on a scientific principle or dis-
covery, and the scientific basis of spectrographic identification is weak. 
The premise upon which the technique is founded, that the spectral 
characteristics of every voice are unique, has never been demonstrated 
by any empirical data. 74 Furthermore, that premise seems somewhat 
suspect in view of one authority's opinion that certain voices are "con-
fusable" even when spectrographic analysis is used. 75 Although there-
sults of the Tosi experiment would seem to rebut any suggestion that 
the basic premise of the technique is unfounded, that premise will still 
be subject to question until additional experiments have been carried 
out to investigate the effects of voice mimicry on spectrographic voice 
identification. 
Even if its basic premise is accepted as a valid scientific principle, 
72 See, e.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 
1042 (1975); State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). 
Frye was not applied to spectrographic evidence in Franks, but the court stated in a 
footnote: "[W]e deem general acceptance as being nearly synonymous with reliability. If 
a scientific process is reliable, or sufficiently accurate, courts may also deem it 'generally 
accepted.'" /d. at 33 n.12. United States v. Brown, 13 CRIM. L. REP. 2203 (D.C. Super. 
Ct. May 1, 1973), is a much better reasoned opinion in favor of using reliability as a 
criterion for admissibility under Frye. The court in Brown reasoned that since reliability 
underlies the general acceptance test, the court must first decide whether the technique 
is reliable and then whether it is generally accepted as reliable. The Brown formulation 
is obviously more correct than the Franks approach, which would devitalize the general 
acceptance standard. 
73 Addison, 498 F.2d at 744. 
74 Comment, The Evidentiary Value of Spectrographic Voice Identification, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. 
& ~ s. 343, 345 (1972). 
75 Id. at 351; United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
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the identification process as a whole can hardly be called scientific. 
Once a spectrogram is produced the scientific aspect of the process is 
complete. The subsequent analysis of the spectrogram is more akin to 
an art than a science, 76 with the skill and experience of the examiner 
accounting for much of the reliability of the result. There are no ob-
jective decisional criteria, such as those used in fingerprint analysis77 
or ballistics, for the examiner to use in making an identification. One 
authority in the field, Dr. Peter Ladefoged, has testified: "I couldn't 
state exactly what it was that Lt. Nash was doing when he makes an 
identification, nor indeed what I'm doing myself. I can simply look at 
the patterns and say they are similiar [sic] .... " 78 The process be-
comes even more subjective when, as in Lykus, the examiner is re-
quired to compare a whispered telephone conversation held in a noisy 
environment with a later recording in a quiet laboratory. Both Dr. 
Tosi and Lt. Nash testified that in such a situation the examiner must 
rely very heavily on aural comparison. 79 Although aural comparison 
alone is admissible in most jurisdictions, 80 the jury should not be led 
to believe that a scientific process is involved if spectrogram compari-
son plays an insignificant part in the identification process. 
Even in situations where visual comparison of spectrograms is help-
ful, the subjective aspect of the process does not end with a judgment 
that two spectrograms are similar. As was mentioned earlier,81 the ex-
aminer must then make another subjective decision whether differ-
ences in similar spectrograms are due to intraspeaker variability or in-
terspeaker variability. Thus the bulk of the spectrographic voice iden-
tification process is nothing more than an expert opinion.82 It seems 
somewhat questionable, then, whether Frye, which deals with scientific 
evidence, should be applied to such an unscientific process. 
The Court's application of Frye in Lykus is also suspect because the 
benefits derived from Frye's application are not obtained where, as is 
the case with spectrographic analysis, only a small number of experts 
are available. Proponents of the Frye rule have suggested that three 
76 People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 451, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478, 487 (1968). 
77 For a discussion of the differences between spectrographic analysis and fingerprint 
analysis, see Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Stevens and Pickett, Speaker IdentifiCation by 
Speech Spectrograms: A Scientist's View oj. its Reliability for Legal Purposes, 47 J. AcousTICAL 
Soc·v AM. 597 (1970). 
78 People v. Law, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 79 n.IO, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 715 n.10. 
79 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 746 n.7, 748 n.12, 327 N.E.2d at 681 n.7, 682 n.12. 
80 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 719, 732 n.4, 327 N.E.2d 
671, 677, n.4; State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 447-50, 192 N.W.2d 
432, 435-37 (1971). . 
81 See text at note 20, supra. 
82 At the time of the Lykus decision the process actually seemed to be little more than 
the opinion of one expert, Lt. Nash, since he had been the expert witness in every case 
in which an appellate decision had been rendered on the question of admissibility. See 
cases cited in note 49, supra. 
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benefits are derived from its application. First, the requirement of 
general acceptance assures that only qualified experts will assess the 
validity of a scientific process.83 Second, the Frye test assures that ex-
perts will be available to testify for both the prosecution and defense 
when the validity of a scientific determination in an individual case is 
being questioned. 84 Third, application of the Frye standard prevents 
the trial of the technique rather than the trial of the real issues in the 
case.85 
In its application of the Frye standard in Lykus, the Court noted that 
when only a small number of people claim to be experts in a particu-
lar area, two major goals of the standard are arguably put in 
jeopardy. First, the general validity of the technique may not be 
judged by qualified experts because of the small number of qualified 
people available. Second, lack of qualified personnel may deprive one 
of the parties of an expert who will testify in his behalf.86 The Court 
did not discuss the validity of these apparently relevant objections to 
the application of Frye in Lykus. Instead, the Court proceeded to limit 
the number of available experts even further by discounting the opin-
ions of those without empirical experience.87 The objectives of Frye do 
not seem to be well served by its application in these circumstances. 
A final argument against the application of Frye in Lykus is that the 
general acceptance standard is unworkable and should be discarded 
entirely. Despite its supposed advantages and despite its adoption by 
many jurisdictions88 since its formulation in 1923, the Frye standard 
has been criticized as being unduly restrictive. 89 Critics suggest that 
the increasing prominence of scientific evidence makes the require-
ment of general acceptance impracticable, especially in view of the 
rapid acceleration of scientific advancement.90 In addition, they point 
out that administrative agencies are accepting many of the forms of 
evidence that courts are rejecting. 91 The artificial standard of general 
acceptance is said to obscure what should be the proper considera-
83 United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
84 /d. at 744. 
85 State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 332, 239 A.2d 680, 684 (1968). 
88 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 734, 327 N.E.2d at 677. 
87 /d. at 736, 327 N.E.2d at 678 n.6. 
88 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963); People v. 
Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949); State v. Arnwine, 67 N.J. Super. 483, 
171 A.2d 124 (1961). 
89 See, e.g., Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientifu: Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. 
L. FoRUM 1, 14 [hereinafter cited as Strong]; Boyce, judicial Recognition of Scientifu: Evi-
dence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313, 327 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Boyce]. 
eo Boyce, supra note 89, at 327. 
91Jd. 
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tions when scientific evidence is offered.92 
Foremost among Frye's critics is Professor McCormick,93 who has 
proposed the following standard for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence: 
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking 
judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are 
supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless 
there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, probative value 
may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or mis-
leading the jury, and undue consumption of time. If the courts 
used this approach, instead of repeating a supposed requirement 
of "general acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would arrive 
at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific advances. 94 
This approach, which seems to be little more than the traditional 
test for the admission of expert testimony,95 would treat lack of gen-
eral acceptance by the relevant scientific community as a factor to be 
considered in weighing the evidence, but not as a factor affecting ad-
missibility. The McCormick formulation can be viewed as a three con-
dition test for admissibility. First, any scientific evidence offered must 
be relevant; it must have some probative value to assist the jury.96 
Thus, some reasonable showing of the reliability of the technique 
must be made. Second, the scientific evidence must be offered by a 
qualified expert in the field from which the evidence is drawn. Third, 
and most important, there must be no other valid reasons for exclu-
sion of the evidence. Under this test, the question of admissibility is 
solely within the traditional discretion of the trial judge. 
Several courts have already apparently adopted an approach similar 
to that advocated by McCormick. 97 In United States v. Wright, 98 for ex-
ample, after the prosecution made an initial showing of the reliability 
of spectrographic identification, the United States Court of Military 
Appeals treated the scientific evidence in the same way as expert tes-
timony, leaving the question of weight to the finders of fact. 99 The 
92 Strong, supra note 89, at 14. Professor Strong states that scientific evidence raises es-
sentially the question of relevancy, and thus the proper considerations are the probative 
value of the evidence, its possible misuse in the hands of laymen jurors, and the degree 
of its dramatic intrusion on the ultimate legal issues in the case. !d. 
93 C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,§ 203, at 491 (2d ed. 1972). 
94 !d. 
95 See id. § 13, at 29-31. See note 52 supra. 
96 /d., § 185, at 438; l j. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,§ 28, at 409-10 (3d ed. 1940). 
97 E.g., Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68, 70-71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969), appeals dis-
missed, 234 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970). 
98 17 U.S.C.M.A. 183 (1967). 
99 !d. at 189. 
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concurring opinion in State v. Worley 100 advocated a similar approach. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently 
chose not to apply Frye in United States v. Baller, to 1 using instead the 
McCormick test: "Unless an exaggerated popular opinion of the accu-
racy of a particular technique makes its use prejudicial or likely to 
mislead the jury, it is better to admit relevant scientific evidence in the 
same manner as other expert testimony and allow its weight to be at-
tacked by cross-examination and refutation."102 
The Court in Lykus mentioned the McCormick approach at one 
point in the opinion103 and noted the possibility that the Court had 
already modified the Frye and Fatalo holdings in two recent cases, 
Commonwealth v. Devlin 104 and Commonwealth v. Gilbert. 105 In Devlin, 106 
a radiologist testified that, based on his years of experience in viewing 
X-rays, it was his opinion that no two persons have exactly the same 
bone structure. He then identified the remains of a murder victim by 
comparison of X-rays. The Court held that his testimony was admissi-
ble solely on the basis of his qualifications as an expert. 107 The Frye 
standard was not applied because no disputed scientific instrument, 
such as the polygraph, was involved, nor was the radiologist's opin-
ion based on a "scientific theory." 108 The Court viewed his medical 
opinion as a product of his years of experience rather than as a pro-
duct of a "scientific theory." The Court, however, did not explain just 
when and how a medical opinion based on experience becomes ele-
vated to the stature of a "scientific theory," and thus subject to the re-
strictive Frye standard. The reasoning in Devlin was followed in 
Gilbert, 109 where the same method of identification was used and the 
evidence was once again held admissible. 
Devlin and Lykus illustrate the problems the Court has faced in 
using the inflexible Frye standard. Both decisions, although possibly 
meritorious in result, seem questionable from an analytical perspec-
tive. The identical result could have been reached in either case 
100 263 So.2d 613, 615 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). 
101 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975\. 
102 /d. at 466, citing C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,§ 203, at 491 
(2d ed. 1972). 
103 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 735, 327 N.E.2d at 678. 
104 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 583, 310 N.E.2d 353. 
105 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1185,314 N.E.2d Ill. 
106 For a discussion of the Court's treatment of Frye in Devlin, see Fenton, Evidence, 
1974 ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 9.7, at 175. 
107 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 588, 310 N.E.2d at 357. 
108 Devlin is closely analogous to Lykus in that both cases involved a single expert, see 
note 82, supra, using a little known comparative identification technique in which ex-
perience plays a major role. In Lykus, the Supreme Judicial Court declined to say 
whether Devlin was applicable to any circumstances other than those involved in that 
case. 
109 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1190-91, 314 N.E.2d at ll5. 
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within a sound analytical framework if the Court had simply rejected 
Frye and adopted the McCormick approach. In Devlin the normal 
rules for expert testimony were ultimately applied.U 0 Use of the 
McCormick formulation in the first instance would have merely ob-
viated the specious distinction between a medical opinion based on 
years of experience and a scientific theory. In Lykus, the Court held 
that the technique had acquired general acceptance, but still placed a 
limitation on the full admissibility of spectrographic evidence.111 The 
result, from a trial judge's perspective, is almost identical to that 
which would have been reached under the McCormick test. 
Before placing its caveat on the full admissibility of spectrographic 
voice identification, the Lykus Court stressed, as does McCormick, that 
the question of admissibility is still within the traditional discretion of 
the trial judge.U2 The Court then warned: 
We add that the admission of expert testimony as to spectro-
graphic analysis should be subject to the closest judicial scrutiny, 
particularly in any case where there is an absence of evidence of 
voice identification other than that of the voiceprint or where, but 
for the voiceprint, there would be insufficient evidence to warrant 
any inference of the defendant's guilt.l13 
In any individual case a trial judge could reach the same result under 
the McCormick test because the evidence could still be excluded 
where prejudicial. A strong argument could be advanced that the 
aura of certainty engendered by the scientific nature of the evidence 
would be highly prejudicial in the absence of other voice identification 
evidence. The result under the McCormick test, then, would be very 
similar to that reached by the Court but .would be analytically sounder. 
The Court might have been reluctant to discard Frye entirely be-
cause it had recently applied the general acceptance standard in 
Commonwealth v. A juvenile (No. 1)11\ where the defendant sought to 
introduce polygraphic evidence. The Frye standard was originally 
"
0 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 588, 310 N.E.2d at 357. 
"' 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 737-38, 327 N.E.2d at 679. 
"" Id. at 737, 327 N.E.2d at 679. 
"
3 Id. at 737-38, 327 N.E.2d at 678. Commonwealth v. Vitello, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
769, 327 N.E.2d 819, decided after Lykus, does not provide much insight into the im-
pact of this limitation on the Lykus holding. In Vitello, defendants were convicted of vio-
lations of various gaming laws, one of the convictions being for use of a telephone for 
the purpose of accepting wagers and registering bets. Lt. Nash used spectrographic 
voice identification to identify the defendants' voices from certain incriminating tele-
phone calls. It is not clear from the opinion whether any additional evidence identified 
the defendants as the speakers. The Court did not discuss the issue at length, stating 
merely: "The opinions of Lt. Nash were properly received in evidence, under reasoning 
as shown in our opinion in Commonwealth v. Lykus .... " 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 778, 
327 N.E.2d at 827. 
"
4 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 907, 313 N.E.2d 120. 
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formulated because of judicial reluctance to admit polygraphic 
evidence115 and has stood as an effective bar to the admission of such 
evidence for many years. However, it is not necessary to use only one 
test for all types of scientific evidence. The Court could easily limit 
the Frye test to polygraphic evidence and adopt a different test or a 
variety of tests for other types of scientific evidence. The Court took 
the first step toward such a distinction in Lykus by distinguishing 
polygraphic analysis from spectrographic analysis and other compara-
tive identification techniques. 116 The Court used this distinction to jus-
tify the different treatment accorded to spectrographic and poly-
graphic analysis under the Frye standard, 117 but the same distinction 
could be used to justify application of different standards entirely. 
In conclusion, the Court ostensibly applied Frye in Lykus, but, as Jus-
tice Kaplan noted in dissent, its conclusion of general acceptability is 
somewhat suspect. Decisions from other jurisdictions do not directly 
support the Court's conclusion and the process of discounting critical 
opinions seems improper under Frye. However, the Court encoun-
tered these analytical difficulties solely because of its decision in the 
first instance to apply Frye. If a more liberal standard, such as the 
McCormick test, had been applied, admission of the evidence would 
have been considerably easier. 
In both Devlin and Lykus, the Court has gone to some lengths to 
avoid the harshness of Frye, but it has not yet explicitly adopted a 
more liberal test, such as that proposed by McCormick. Whether the 
Court will discard the Frye standard in the future is not clear. If it 
does not adopt a new standard, the Court will probably be forced to 
avoid Frye's application, as it did in Devlin, or pay lip service to Frye 
while applying something .that bears little resemblance to a general ac-
ceptance standard, as it did in Lykus. It is submitted that adoption of 
an approach similar to that advocated by McCormick would be the 
115 Frye was one of the first cases to consider the admissibility of polygraphic evi-
dence. The court cited no authority for the admissibility test· it proposed. Frye v. 
United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
116 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 727, 327 N.E.2d at 674-75. The Court distinguished the 
comparison involved in spectrographic analysis from the extrapolation made in poly-
graphic analysis and added that, in any case, polygraphic evidence may constitute an 
unwarranted intrusion into the jury's functions. I d. 
117 Polygraphic evidence was admitted in Commonwealth v. A. Juvenile (No. 1), 1974 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 907, 313 N.E.2d 120, but admissibility was strictly limited to the follow-
ing four situations: (1) where the defendant moves that he be allowed to submit to an 
examination conducted by an examiner of his own choosing; (2) where the defendant 
moves that he be allowed to submit to an examination administered by an expert cho-
sen by the Commonwealth; (3) where the defendant moves to be allowed to submit to 
'an examination conducted by a jointly selected examiner; (4) where the defendant 
moves that the court appoint an examiner; Id. No such limitations were imposed on the 
admissibility of spectrographic evidence in Lykus. 
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best way to avoid the inconsistencies that have appeared in the law as 
the Court has struggled with the Frye standard. The Court should 
recognize the limited utility of the artificial and inflexible Frye test and 
reject it as inappropriate for the various new types of scientific evi-
dence. 
WILLIAM E. MoDER! 
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